Abstract In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals defined by doubly controlled reflected backward stochastic differential equations.
Introduction
In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by reflected backward stochastic differential equations (RBSDEs, for short). Fleming and Souganidis [7] were the first in a rigorous way to study zero-sum stochastic differential games. Since the pioneering work of Fleming and Souganidis [7] , stochastic differential games have been investigated by many authors. Recently, Buckdahn and Li [3] generalized the results of Fleming and Souganidis [7] by using a Girsanov transformation argument and a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short) approach. The reader interested in this topic can be referred to Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Quincampoix [1] , Buckdahn and Li [3] , Fleming and Souganidis [7] and the references therein.
El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez [5] introduced RBSDEs. By virtue of RBSDEs they gave a probabilistic representation for the solution of an obstacle problem for a nonlinear parabolic partial differential equation. This kind of RBSDEs also has many applications in finance, stochastic differential games and stochastic optimal control problem. In [6] , El Karoui, Pardoux and Quenez showed that the price of an American option corresponds to the solution of a RBSDE. Buckdahn and Li [4] considered zero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection. Wu and Yu [12] studied one kind of stochastic recursive optimal control problem with the obstacle constraint for the cost functional defined by a RBSDE.
Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [2] studied Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential games. Recently, Lin [9, 10] studied Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by doubly controlled BSDEs. Lin [9, 10] generalizes the earlier result by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [2] . In [9, 10] , the admissible control processes can depend on events occurring before the beginning of the stochastic differential game, thus, the cost functionals are not necessarily deterministic. Moreover, the cost functionals are defined with the help of BSDEs, and thus they are nonlinear. The objective of this paper is to generalize the above results, i.e., investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection. However, different from the earlier results by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [2] and Lin [9, 10] , we shall study Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential games with the running cost functionals defined with the help of RBSDEs. For this, we first study the properties of the value functions of stochastic differential games with reflection. In comparison with Buckdahn and Li [4] , we shall study nonzero-sum stochastic differential games of the type of strategy against strategy, while Buckdahn and Li [4] considered the games of the type strategy against control. Combining the arguments in Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Quincampoix [1] and Buckdahn and Li [4] , we can get the results in Section 4. Then we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential games with reflection. Our results generalizes the results in Lin [9] to the obstacle constraint case. In Lin [9] , the cost functionals of both players do not have any obstacle constraint, so our results in Section 5 are more general. The proof of our results is mainly based on the techniques of mathematical analysis and the properties of BSDEs with reflection. The presence of the obstacle constraint adds us the difficulty of estimates and a supplementary complexity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notations and present some preliminary results concerning reflected backward stochastic differential equations, which we will need in what follows. In Section 3, we introduce nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection and obtain the associated dynamic programming principle. In Section 4 we give a probabilistic interpretation of systems of Isaacs equations with obstacle. In Section 5, we obtain the main results of this paper, i.e., an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection. In Section 6, we give the proof of Theorem 5.5.
Preliminaries
The objective of this section is to recall some results about RBSDEs, which are useful in what follows. Let B = {B t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T } be a d−dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a probability space (Ω, F , P). The filtration F = {F t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T } is generated by B and augmented by all P−null sets, i.e.,
where N P is the set of all P−null sets. Let us introduce some spaces:
We consider the following one barrier reflected BSDE with data (f, ξ, S):
where {K t } is an adapted, continuous and increasing process, f : Ω × [0, T ] × R × R d → R and we make the following assumptions:
(H2.1) f (·, 0, 0) ∈ H 2 (0, T ; R), (H2.2) There exists some constant L > 0 such that for all y, y ′ ∈ R and z, z
The following the existence and uniqueness theorem for solutions of equation (2.1) was established in [5] .
We refer to [5] and [12] for the following two estimates. Lemma 2.2. Let the assumptions (H2.1)-(H2.3) hold and let (Y, Z, K) be the solution of the reflected BSDE (2.1) with data (ξ, g, S). Then there exists a positive constant C such that 
Then there exists a constant C such that
where
We also need the following lemma. For its proof, the interested reader can refer to [5] and [8] for more details.
Lemma 2.4. Let us denote by
(Ω, F T , P; R), S 1 and S 2 satisfy (H2.3), and f 1 and f 2 satisfy the assumptions (H2.1) and (H2.2), and the following holds In what follows, we assume that U and V are two compact metric spaces. The space U is considered as the control state space of the first player, and V as that of the second one. We denote the associated sets of admissible controls by U and V, respectively. The set U is formed by all U -valued F-progressively measurable processes, and V is the set of all V -valued F-progressively measurable processes.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, let us consider the following control system: for
We make the following assumptions:
Under the above assumptions, for any u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, the control system (3.1) has a unique strong solution {X
t,x;u,v s , 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T }, and we also have the following standard estimates for solutions.
where the constant C p only depends on p, the Lipschitz constant and the linear growth of b and σ.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, let us consider the following doubly controlled RBSDEs: for j = 1, 2,
where X t,x;u,v is introduced in equation (3.1) and
, and there exist positive constants C and α ≥
Under the assumption (H3.3), from [5] we know that equation (3.2) admits a unique solution. For given control processes u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V , let us introduce now the associated cost functional for player j, j = 1, 2,
From Buckdahn and Li [4] we have the following estimates for solutions. 
We now recall the definition of admissible controls and NAD strategies, which was introduced in [9] .
Definition 3.3. The space U t,T (resp., V t,T ) of admissible controls for 1 th player (resp., 2 nd ) on the interval [t, T ] is defined as the space of all processes {u r } r∈[t,T ] (resp., {v r } r∈[t,T ] ), which are F-progressively measurable and take values in U (resp., V ).
Definition 3.4.
A nonanticipative strategy with delay (NAD strategy) for 1 th player is a measurable mapping α : V t,T → U t,T , which satisfies the following properties:
1) α is a nonanticipative strategy, i.e., for every F-stopping time τ : Ω → [t, T ], and for
2) α is a strategy with delay, i.e., for all v ∈ V t,T , there exists an increasing sequence of stopping
We denote the set of all NAD strategies for 1 th player for games over the time interval [t, T ] by A t,T . The set of all NAD strategies β : U t,T → V t,T for 2 nd player for games over the time interval [t, T ] is defined in a symmetrical way and we denote it by B t,T .
NAD strategy allows us to put stochastic differential games under normal form. The following lemma was established in [9] .
If (α, β) ∈ A t,T × B t,T , then from Lemma 3.5 we have a unique couple (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T such that (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v). Then let us put J j (t, x; α, β) = J j (t, x; u, v). Therefore, let us define: for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , Proposition 3.6. Under the assumptions (H3.1)-(H3.3), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , the value functions W j (t, x) and U j (t, x) are deterministic functions.
Let us now recall the definition of stochastic backward semigroups, which was first introduced by Peng [11] to study stochastic optimal control problem. For a given initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , 0 ≤ δ ≤ T − t, for admissible control processes u(·) ∈ U t,t+δ and v(·) ∈ V t,t+δ , and a real-valued random variable η ∈ L 2 (Ω, F t+δ , P; R) such that η ≥ h j (t + δ, X t,x;u,v t+δ ), we define
is the unique solution of the following reflected BSDE over the time
and X t,x;u,v is the unique solution of equation (3.1).
Remark 3.7. We consider a special case of f j . If f j is independent of (y, z), then we have 
and
The proof of the above proposition is similar to [1] and [10] , we omit the proof here. 
The same properties hold true for the function U j .
By means of the standard arguments and Proposition 3.8 we can easily get the above proposition. The proof of the above proposition is omitted here.
Probabilistic interpretation of systems of Isaacs equations with obstacle
The objective of this section is to give a probabilistic interpretation of systems of Isaacs equations with obstacle, and show that W j and U j introduced in Section 3, are the viscosity solutions of the following Isaacs equations with obstacle, for (t,
respectively, where We denote by C Definition 4.1. For fixed j = 1, 2, let w j ∈ C([0, T ] × R n ; R) be a function. It is called (i) a viscosity subsolution of (4.1) if
and if for all functions ϕ ∈ C
(ii) a viscosity supersolution of (4.1) if
and if for all functions ϕ ∈ C 3 l,b ([0, T ] × R n ), and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n such that w j − ϕ attains a local minimum at (t, x),
(iii) a viscosity solution of (4.1) if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a supersolution of (4.1).
We adapt the methods in Buckdahn and Li [4] and Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Quincampoix [1] to our framework. We can obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Under the assumptions (H3.1)-(H3.
3), the function W j (resp., U j ) is a viscosity solution of the system (4.1) (resp., (4.2)).
Let us now give a comparison theorem for the viscosity solution of (4.1) and (4.2). We first introduce the following space: , if an upper semicontinuous function u 1 ∈ Θ is a viscosity subsolution of (4.1) (resp., (4.2)), and a lower semicontinuous function u 2 ∈ Θ is a viscosity supersolution of (4.1) (resp., (4.2)), then we have the following:
By means of the arguments in Buckdahn and Li [4] , we can give the proof of this theorem and the proof is omitted here.
Remark 4.4. By Proposition 3.9 we see that W j (resp., U j ) is a viscosity solution of linear growth. Therefore, from the above theorem we know that W j (resp., U j ) is the unique viscosity solution in Θ of the system (4.1) (resp., (4.2)). 
Isaacs condition:
In a symmetric way, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , we put
Using the arguments in [1] and [10] , we have the following propositions.
Proposition 4.6. Under the assumptions (H3.1)-(H3.3), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , the value functions W j (t, x) and U j (t, x) are deterministic functions. Isaacs condition: 
Nash equilibrium payoffs
The objective of this section is to obtain an existence of a Nash equilibrium payoff. For this, we consider two zero-sum stochastic differential games associated with J 1 and J 2 , i.e., the first player wants to maximize J 1 and the second player wants to minimize J 1 , while the first player wants to minimize J 2 and the second player wants to maximize
In what follows, we redefine the following notations which are different from the above sections:
We suppose that the following holds:
Isaacs condition A:
Definition 5.1. A couple (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ R 2 is called a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x) if for any ε > 0, there exists (α ε , β ε ) ∈ A t,T × B t,T such that, for all (α, β) ∈ A t,T × B t,T ,
From Lemma 3.5 it follows that the following lemma holds.
Lemma 5.2. For any ε > 0 and (α ε , β ε ) ∈ A t,T × B t,T , (5.2) holds if and only if, for all (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T ,
Before giving the main results in this sections we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n and u ∈ U t,T be arbitrarily fixed. Then, (i) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ A t,T such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
(ii) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ A t,T such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
Using arguments similar to Lin [9] we can prove this lemma. The proof is omitted here. We also need the following lemma, which can be established by standard arguments for SDEs. 
Let us now give one of main results in this section: the characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with reflection. We postpone its proof to Section 6. Theorem 5.5. Let Isaacs condition (4.3) hold and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n . If for all ε > 0, there exist u ε ∈ U t,T and v ε ∈ V t,T such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
then (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ R 2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at point (t, x).
Before giving the existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium payoff we first establish the following proposition, which is crucial for the proof of the existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium payoff.
Proposition 5.6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5.5, for all ε > 0, there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T ×V t,T independent of F t such that, for all t ≤ s 1 ≤ s 2 ≤ T , j = 1, 2,
Let us first give some preliminary result. Since the proof of the following lemma is similar to that in [9] , we omit here.
Let us establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.8. Let n ≥ 1 and let us fix some partition t = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n = T of the interval [t, T ]. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T ×V t,T independent of F t , such that, for all i = 0, · · · , n−1,
Proof. Let us prove this lemma by induction. By the above lemma, it is obvious for i = 0. We now suppose that (u ε , v ε ) independent of F t , is constructed on the interval [t, t i ) and we shall define it on [t i , t i+1 ). From the above lemma it follows that, for all y ∈ R n , there exists (u y , v y ) ∈ U ti,T × V ti,T independent of F t , such that,
For arbitrarily j = 1, 2, for all y, z ∈ R n and s ∈ [t i , t i+1 ], we set
)], and y
Then let us consider the following BSDEs: 
From the Lemmas 2.3 and 3.1 it follows that ≤ C|y − z|.
Combining the above inequality, Proposition 3.9 and (5.6) we see that
Let us put
which together with (5.7) yields
from which we get the desired result.
Let us come to the proof of Proposition 5.6.
Proof. Let t = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n = T be a partition of [t, T ], and τ = sup i (t i+1 − t i ). By Proposition 3.9
and Lemma 5.4 we see that, for all j = 1, 2, 0
In what follows we shall prove the following:
Then we consider the associated BSDEs: Let us consider the associated BSDEs: Here λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on the real line R. We see that S v and t v are stopping times such that S v ≤ t v ≤ S v + τ . We put
Then, α ε is an NAD strategy. It follows from (6. Using a symmetric argument we can construct β ε ∈ B t,T such that, for all u ∈ U t,T , J 1 (t, x; u, β ε (u)) ≤ J 1 (t, x; u ε0 , v ε0 ) + ε, β ε (u ε0 ) = v ε0 . (6.10)
Finally, from (6.5), (6.10), (6.2) and Lemma 5.2 it follows that (α ε , β ε ) satisfies Definition 5.1. Hence, (e 1 , e 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium payoff.
